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"purpose or intent to injure competitors or destroy competition." Even
if one could ascertain his competitor's intent, or lack of it, he could not
be certain whether the competitor was violating the act. Aside from
the intent element, it is also questionable whether the Washington act
requires an adverse effect upon competition; if an adverse effect is
required, a seller must determine whether his competitor's sales below
cost are "destroying or tending to destroy competition."2
It is submitted that the court should be hesitant to issue injunctions
restraining a defendant from selling below cost to meet competition,
and should liberally construe the good faith exception as it did in the
principal case. Once an injunction is issued, especially if it is phrased
in the broad terms of the statutory provisions against loss leaders and
sales below cost as was done in a California case, 9 the defendant is
significantly restrained in his future pricing policy. He acts at the risk
of subjecting himself to a contempt citation whenever he makes a sale
which might be found to violate an ambiguous statute.
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING ACT OF 1965-AN
EXPERIMENT IN CREATIVE FEDERALISM
The concept of "creative federalism"' is as elusive as it is new. As
a descriptive term, "creative federalism" describes not what federalstate relations presently are but what they ought to be. In order to
Under Secretary of Commerce, in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960), and
From D. Beryl Manischewitz, National Association of Manufacturers, Id. at 154.
The subcommittee was considering an amendment to the Federal Trade Commission
Act which would have prohibited sales below cost.
I WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.90.040 (1959) ends with the words "whereby a sale below
cost is effected, to the injury of a competitor, and where the same destroys or tends
to destroy competition." In Martin v. Alienikoff, 63 Wn. 2d 842, 389 P.2d 422
(1964), defendant was charged with violating the portion of § 19.90.040 which
prohibits rebates and selective extension of special services. Defendant argued that
the required elements of violation included (1) a sale below cost, (2) injury to
competitors, and (3) destruction or tendency to destroy competition. Plaintiff
contended that only the act of granting rebates or services needed to be shown,
because the three elements listed above appear in clauses disconnected from the
prohibitive clauses. The court accepted defendant's construction, except that no
mention was made of element (3) in the court's holding.
If destruction or tendency to destroy competition is required, what adverse
economic effect would meet the requirement? In the principal case, the alleged
injury to competition was spoilage of competitors' unsold chickens. This may have
been injury to competitors within the meaning of the act, but it is certainly arguable
that there was no destruction nor tendency to destroy competition.
'People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9, 15 (1944).
'The phrase appeared in Ways, Creative Federalism and the Great Society,
Fortune, Jan. 1966, p. 121. President Johnson reportedly used the term to refer to the
Appalachian Regional Development Act, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 17. The cre-

19671

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

appreciate the concept it is necessary to understand the argument that
governmental activities no longer revolve around a politics of issues
but rather now center in a politics of problem-solving.2 The question
no longer is: Is it to be done? Rather the inquiry is: How is it to be
done? Creative federalism recognizes the need of asking state and
local governments the "how to do it" questions.3 By asking these
questions a federal-state partnership is formed. This partnership is
designed to capture the problem-solving genius of various societal
groups and to create an inner tension through the advocacy of conflicting solutions. Out of this tension is supposed to flow a creativity which
will lead to the optimum solutions of today's problems.
Before creative federalism can begin to function two conditions must
be met. In the first place, any existing antagonisms between the partners in the area of action must be avoided or removed. Creative federalism can not function where there are impediments to joint venture.
Secondly, but not unrelated, the assumption that power is a constant
to be grabbed by one group only at the expense of another must be
discarded in favor of an opposite assumption.' Power in many current situations is an expandable entity; an increase in federal and state
power can occur simultaneouslyP If state and federal governments
make such an assumption, then a theoretical obstacle to joint venture
will be removed and incentive to embark on an experiment in creative
federalism will be provided.
Initial experiments in creative federalism have been, and are being,
undertaken in areas where new approaches are desperately needed.6
ative federalism in the Appalachia Regional Development Act, 79 Stat. 5 (1965),
40 U.S.C. § 461 (Supp. 1966), is exemplified in the Act's approach to the poverty problem. Rather than expending Federal funds where the economic need is the greatest,
the Act contemplates the expenditure of funds where the expected return on public
dollar investment will be the greatest. By stimulating the economy in urban areas
and by building roads from the rural to urban centers, the problem of poverty is
supposed to be overcome. This is significant as an effort in creative federalism
because the focus in public spending is changed from the area of greatest needs to
the2 area of production. Fortune, Jan. 1966, pp. 222-23.
Fortune, Jan. 1966, p. 122.

'See generally Muskie, The Challenge of Creative Federalism, Saturday Rev.,
June 25, 1966, pp. 12-14.
'See Fortune, Jan. 1966, p. 122.
'In other words, power is not to be viewed as a constant quantity to be carved up
and distributed. When the federal government takes a larger slice of power there is
no necessary reduction of power in any other sphere of influence.
'For example, the Economic Development Act, the Intergovernmental Cooperation
Act, the Demonstration Cities Act, and the Urban Development Act to some extent or
another reflect the creative federalism approach. See Saturday Rev., June 25, 1966,
p. 13. See also Hart, Creative Federalism: Recent Trends in Regional Water Resources Planning and Development, 39 CoLo. L. REv. 29, 38 (1966), where the author
points to the Clean Waters Restoration Act of 1966, P.L. 89-753, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), as an example of creative federalism.
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These efforts will either crystalize the concept or cause it to vanish
as suddenly as it appeared. One recent experiment is unique in that
it attacks the problems of an entire field at the very basic level of planning, and does so by creating new machinery capable of utilizing older
and more proven parts. The Water Resources Planning Act of 19 6 5 1
is significant as an experiment in creative federalism though not consciously drafted as such an experiment. It is probable that many of
the pressures which created the need for the Act also worked to bring
into current use the notion of "creative federalism."
Water is a vital natural resource which must be regulated in order
to insure proper utilization. If regulations are to be effective and
maximize water use, they must be planned and coordinated. The
Water Resources Planning Act attempts to provide for requisite planning and coordination. The Act reflects recent trends in water resource development.8 Originally of primarily local concern, water
resource development has taken on a federal dimension in such areas
as flood control, irrigation, navigation, power, water supply, and water
quality control. Expanding federal involvement has created a need for
planning at the national level; this was first recognized in the Hoover
Commission Reports in 1948.' The Report of the Water Resources
Policy Commission recommended in 1951 that the Truman administration create a body to coordinate water resource development on a nationwide basis."° An advisory committee appointed by President Eisenhower made a similar recommendation in 1955." Finally, in 1959, the
Senate created the Select Committee on National Water Resources to
study fundamental requirements of national water policy. The Committee's report advocated comprehensive national planning and improvement of state and local planning as primary action areas.' In 1961 President Kennedy, completing plans initiated by the Eisen779 Stat. 244 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (Supp. 1966). See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1921 (1965) for the legislative history and purpose of the Water Resources
Planning Act.
I See Stewart, Federal Water Resource Development, 45 ORE. L. REv. 322, 324-29

(1966).
9
See generally MCI NLEY,UzcLE SAmzIn THE PAcmC NORTHWEST (1952).
"9See 1 PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY Com'mN REp. (1950).
n See PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY CoMm. ON WATER RESOURCES POLICY, WATER RESOURCES POLICY (1955).
"See McGuinness, Water for the United States-An Analysis of the Senate Select
Committee on National Water Resources, 2 NATURAL RES. J. 187 (1962); Schad, An
Analysis of the Work of the Senate Select Committee on National

iVater Resources,

id. at 226. See also Hamilton, The Senate Select Committee on National Water Resources: An Ethical and Rational Criticism, id. at 45 where the author questions the
propriety of letting a special interest group of the Senate, as he charges, dictate
national water policy.
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hower administration, requested Congress to enact legislation authorizing comprehensive planning of water resource development on a
national level. The request was accompanied by a proposed act which
served as the foundation for the present enactment."3 The Kennedy
bill, bi-partisan in origin and support, provided for a water resources
council to oversee various plans submitted by different water basin
commissions and for federal aid to states for local water resource
planning. The Eighty-seventh Congress took no action on the bill
requested by President Kennedy. The Eighty-eighth Congress considered revised bills but again took no action.' 4 In July 1965 the
Eighty-ninth Congress finally passed the Water Resources Planning
Act. The machinery created by the Act and its probable operation
are worthy of study and analysis as a new approach not only to water
resource development, but also to problem-solving in general.
I. THE ACT

A. Purpose
The preamble to the Act states that its purpose is "to provide for
the optimum development of the Nation's natural resources through
the coordinated planning of water and related resources ....11
B. Means
Optimum development is to be achieved through the work of a federal water resources council, regional river basin commissions, and
federally assisted state and local agencies. The Act contemplates the
coordination of federal, state and private activities in the area of water
resource development.
In order to insure coordination and cooperation, certain impediments
to joint venture are removed from the scope of the Act. Since some
federal action had been taken without regard to, or in derogation of,
state plans, continual expansion of federal activity in the area of water
resource management had antagonized the states. Moreover, the federal government continued to exert federal water rights that directly
conflicted with state water law.'6 The Act was drafted to avoid these
"S. 2246, H.R. 8177, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
'IS. 1111, H.R. 3620, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). These bills reflected state suggestions making river basin commissions more federal-state in nature. The states
were to appoint and pay their representatives.
"79 Stat. 244 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (Supp. 1966).
"Englebert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAw & Co~srrmp.
PRoB. 325 (1957). See generally Bennett, A Symposium on Federal, State, and Local
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antagonisms by expressly preserving existing federal or state jurisdiction, responsibilities, or rights with respect to water. 1
The Act also attempts to remove another impediment to joint venture by limiting certain activities of entities established or acting under
it. No entity may "study, plan, or recommend the transfer of water
between areas under the jurisdiction of more than one river basin
commission or entity performing the function of a river basin commission."' By this provision the sensitive question of diversion is
theoretically eliminated from the scope of the Act.
The express language of the statute would seem to prohibit both the
Water Resources Council and the river basin commissions from studying diversions of water from one basin to another unless both basins
were under the jurisdiction of one commission. In House proceedings
such a limitation was unequivocally expressed. 9 But the diversion
question is not settled. Despite expressions of Congressional intent,
Henry P. Caulfield, executive director of the Water Resources Council,
has said that he does not think that section 1962-1(d) bars forever
inter-basin transfers.2 0 Under the wording of the Act, for example,
the "entity performing the function of a river basin commission"
might include some study group or council of state officials who meet
to study the problems of water. Thus, the diversion question is still
open and may prove an impediment to joint action.
In any event the Act does not prevent but rather expressly allows
federal agencies acting outside the scope of the Act to undertake any
desirable studies.2 ' To this extent the limitation on the federal governCooperation in Conservation and Development of Water Resources, 45 CALIF. L. REv.
712 (1957); King, Federal-StateRelations in the Control of Water Resources, 37 U.
DET. L.J. 1 (1959).
779 Stat. 244 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962-1 (Supp. 1966).
1879 Stat. 244 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962-1(d) (Supp. 1966).
"H.R. Rep. No. 603, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965):
This language is intended to make it clear that the authority which is given to

the Water Resources Council and to the river basin commissions established

under S. 21 does not include authority to study and report upon the transfer of
waters between basins or areas that are appropriate for planning on a comprehensive basis.
oAddress by Henry P. Caulfield, Jr., Columbia River Water Congress for the
Pacific Northwest, April 1, 1966.
1 79 Stat. 244 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1(b), (c) (Supp. 1966), state that federal officials acting under federal laws are not affected by the Water Resources Planning Act
except in so far as they are required to carry out the provisions of planning or preparation. As long as they perform their functions under the Act, it would seem that they are
free to carry out independent planning. Of course, the existence of a cabinet-level

water resources planning council will probably limit Federal agency undertakings

which are not germane to or which conflict with council efforts. See Hart, Creative
Federalism: Recent Trends in Regional Water Resources Planning and Development,

39 CoLo. L. REv. 29, 32-33 (1966).
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ment is not a real one. It would seem that Congress was not about to
let the new experiment tie its hands. The draftsmen of the Act, though
perhaps assuming that power was expandable, were not going to lose
anything if they were wrong. The experiment undertaken in the Act
is a very controlled one.

II. TITLE I-THE WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL
The Council, composed of the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary
of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission and any other appropriate federal agency head appointed by the
President, is a federal inter-agency council created for the purpose of:
(1) maintaining a continuing study and biennial assessment of the
adequacy of water supplies to meet water requirements; (2) reviewing
the plans of river basin commissions and transmitting such plans to
Congress through the President; (3) coordinating federal planning
efforts and supervising state programs that receive federal assistance;
(4) appraising the adequacy of existing and proposed policies and programs; and (5) making recommendations to the President with respect
to federal policies and programs. The President is authorized to appoint a Council chairman to supervise the activities of the Council and
its staff.
The Council is designed to coordinate the planning activities of the
several federal agencies concerned with the conservation, development,
and use of water resources and to serve as the main channel of communication for state and regional views on federal water resource
development." In addition, the Council dispenses federal funds to
states to stimulate their planning endeavors and make their views more
authoritative. 3 If the experiment in creative federalism is to succeed,
the Council must fulfill dual roles. On the one hand, the Council must
be the coordinator of the federal agencies and, on the other, guardian
of regional and local interests. From the creativity generated, the
Council must make "recommendations as it deems desirable in the
national interest."2 4 In the tension between federal, regional, and local
interests it must chart the optimum course-a Herculean task to say
the very least.
79 Stat. 245 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962a-3(3) (b) (Supp. 1966).

79 Stat. 251 (1965), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1962c

(Supp. 1966). See text accompanying note

42 infra.
' 79 Stat. 245 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962a-3(3) (a) (Supp. 1966).
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TITLE II-RIVER BASIN COMMISSIONS

These commissions epitomize the effort to create a federal-state
partnership.
A. Creation
The President has the power to create river basin commissions.
Certain conditions precedent must be met before the President may
exercise his power, though. In the first place, the Council or a state
must request in writing the establishment of a river basin commission.
Such a request must carefully define the exact geographical area to be
included in the proposed commission. Secondly, such a request must be
concurred in by (a) the Council and (b) not less than one half of the
states located within the basin or basins concerned. Such concurrence
must be in writing, identify the same geographical areas, and be signed
by the governors of the concurring states.
In the creation provisions under Title II certain accommodations to
special interests were made. In the event a basin is formed which
includes the Upper Colorado River, at least three of the four states of
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming must concur in such formation. For example, suppose a majority of states lying within the
Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins request the formation of a
two-basin commission. That request can not be considered by the
Council or the President unless three of the four named states are
among the states requesting the commission. In the event the Columbia River Basin is involved, at least three of the four states of Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Washington must concur.2
B. Duties
A river basin commission serves as principal agent for coordinating
all federal, state, local, and non-governmental plans for water resource
development in its defined area. It prepares comprehensive plans for
joint action in the development of water and related resources, "provided, That the plan shall include an evaluation of all reasonable alternative means of achieving optimum development....",2" This provision, it would seem, attempts to institutionalize the tension factor of
creative federalism. To better insure that such evaluations are cogent,
the commission is authorized to undertake any independent study that
will aid in the preparation of its plans. In addition and complemenZ79 Stat. 246 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b(a)(3) (Supp. 1966).
79 Stat. 246 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b(b) (2) (Supp. 1966).
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tary to joint planning efforts, a commission shall "recommend long
range schedules of priorities for the collection and analysis of basic
27
data and for investigation, planning, and construction of projects .... )
C. Composition
A chairman appointed by the President serves as coordinating officer
for federal members of the commission and acts as the federal representative. The federal members are from federal agencies which the
President determines have a "substantial interest in the work to be
undertaken by the commission"; 2 8 they are appointed to the commission by their respective agencies.
The commission also consists of one member from each state which
lies "wholly or partially within the area, river basin, or group of river
basins for which the commission is established .... 2 9 The member is
appointed by the state in accordance with its laws. In the absence of
governing provisions, the Act states that the governor shall appoint
the state member. One of the state representatives is elected by the
state members to serve as vice-chairman; he acts as the states' representative on the commission.
Particular attention should be given to the words "each state which
lies wholly or partially within the area. . . " The importance of defining the exact geographical area of a river basin has been well illustrated. Governors in the Northwest have asked the Water Resources
Council and the President to authorize a Pacific Northwest River
Basin Commission. The geographical area was initially defined in
those requests as "those parts of Idaho, Montana and Wyoming which
are within the Columbia River Drainage, plus all of Washington and
Oregon except for the Klamath River."3 By excluding the Klamath
River, the Northwestern states thought that California's participation
on such a commission would be precluded. But California argued that
the proposed river basin commission would include the Great Basin
Drainage, Goose Lake, and the Smith and Rogue Rivers and that such
inclusions gave California the right to representation on the Commission.Y Utah and Nevada also asserted their claims for representation.
79 Stat. 246 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b(b)(3) (Supp. 1966).
.'79 Stat. 247 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b-l(b) (Supp. 1966).
79 Stat. 247 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b-1 (c) (Supp. 1966).
' See Colorado River Ass'n, Newsletter, Sept. 1966.
'It should be noted that under § 1962-1(d) of the Act, the right of a river basin

commission to study the question of diversion is limited to those areas under the
jurisdiction of the commission. See text accompanying notes 19 and 20 mrupra. Thus,
were California to become a member of the Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission, the issue of diversion to southern California probably could not be raised be-
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The Water Resources Council then asked the states which had applied
for a Northwest River Basin Commission to define more precisely the
area to be included. New descriptions undoubtedly will attempt to
eliminate the claims of California, Nevada, and Utah.
In addition to federal and state representatives, interstate agencies
and international commissions which function within the area covered
by the river basin commission are entitled to membership; however,
Congress must have consented to the interstate compact before the
interstate agency established under such compact qualifies for membership.
D. Operation
A river basin commission is designed to function only through the
voluntary cooperation of all its members. In fact, participation on a
commission is voluntary; no state is required to provide a representative. The draftsmen of the Water Resources Planning Act did not
provide a rigid operational structure probably for fear that such rigidity would discourage states from forming commissions and would
lessen the effectiveness of any commission created. Relations between
the various members are supposed to be symbiotic, not parasitic.
1. Consensus. The concept of consensus in the Act is the very essence of the experiment in creative federalism. "In the work of the
commission every reasonable endeavor shall be made to arrive at a
consensus of all members on all issues; but failing this, full opportunity
shall be afforded each member for the presentation and report of individual views ... ."I' Provision is made for recording divergent views
when disagreements arise, but consensus is the predominant operational approach in other than procedural matters.33
Original formulations of the Water Resources Planning Act contained voting provisions pursuant to which the chairman representing
the federal agencies and the vice-chairman as the states' representative
were each given a vote. This procedure was attacked on ground that
voting provisions "would tend to foment and perpetuate dissension,
and seem singularly unsuitable for developing or arriving at a constructive consensus. 3 4 Similarly, any procedure which would give
cause no river basin in southern California would be under the jurisdiction of the
proposed commission.
'-79 Stat. 248 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b-2(d) (Supp. 1966).
Ibid.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate
Committee on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1963).
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each member one vote would be unsuitable because there is no proper
constituency for such votes to represent. Interests of various participants can not, for practical political reasons, be accorded equal weight.
For example, it is unlikely that Washington would favor a plan which
gave Wyoming an equal vote on a river basin commission which included the Columbia River. Moreover, the number of federal members on a river basin commission is limited only by the good judgment
of the President. It is easy to foresee a situation where only a few
states belong to a commission whose federal members are numerous.
Voting arrangements in such a situation would presumably be unacceptable to the states involved. Because voting provisions were likely
to create inequities and dissention, the idea of "consensus" evolved.
As used in the Act, "consensus" does not mean unanimity or even
majority opinion. For example, a commission may decide by consensus to submit plan A to the Council, but several members on the commission might prefer plan B. The Act requires that plan A when submitted include an evaluation of plan BY If the views of members are
too divergent, the Chairman records the position of the federal agencies
and the vice-chairman records the positions of the states. All views are
then transmitted to the Council; the Council thereby becomes arbiter
of all very controversial issues. "The arrangement resembles that of a
Congressional conference committee, in which decisions are reached
not by majority vote of the members, but by agreement between the
two sides representing the two Houses." 3 "[A] commission, failing to
agree, has not reached a deadend, but has the means for agreeing to
disagree, for continuing its activities in the hope of reaching consensus,
and for referral of alternatives for legislative decision at the appropriate level of government. 3 7 In effect, the notion of consensus permits the existence of a tension which is creative, not destructive, and
allows the experiment to proceed.
2. Financing. Commission members will be compensated by their
respective agencies or states. The federal government will pay the
salary of the chairman. "Each commission shall recommend what share
of its expenses shall be borne by the Federal Government, but such
share shall be subject to the approval of the Council.""' The remainder of the commission's expenses shall be otherwise apportioned
79 Stat. 245 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962a-3(3) (b) (Supp. 1966).
aAddress by Henry P. Caulfield, Jr. supra note 20.
Z'Address by Henry P. Caulfield, Jr., Cornell Conference on State Planning,
Mfarch 24, 1966.
' 79 Stat. 250 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b-6(a) (Supp. 1966).
3
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as the commission may determine. The federal share is expected to be
fifty per cent of operating costs. The remaining fifty per cent will be
apportioned amongst the states, probably on the basis of their interests.
The federal share can not exceed $750,000 annually in direct aid to a
river basin commission."9
It is quite possible that the federal government will support directly
or indirectly more than half of the commissions' operating expenses.
Under Title III (discussed infra) funds are available to states which
undertake special projects. Such projects might be launched under
the auspices of a river basin commission or some other federal legislation. Nothing in the Act prevents the Council from approving a federal grant to a state for a project that state was obligated to undertake
to fulfill its financial obligations as a member of a river basin commission. Were such a grant made, the federal government, in effect,
would be supporting more than fifty per cent of a river basin commission's operating costs. And, the funds made available to a state for its
own local water planning activities could free other funds and further
enable a state to meet its commission obligations.
In examining river basin commission financing, an interesting hypothetical question is raised: What if a state refuses to pay its allocated share of the expenses and withdraws from the commission?
First, probably nothing would happen. The entire Act is built upon a
notion of voluntary cooperation and participation. It is possible, of
course, that some contractual arrangements may have been made that
would create a legal obligation that the state would have to meet. But
barring such occurrence, nothing would happen. Second, the question
may remain academic. Once a state joins a river basin commission
there would be few if any situations that would prompt the state by
itself to leave the commission. Such a move would only cut off a potentially valuable line of communication for that state's interests. In
resigning from a river basin commission, a state would likely antagonize the Council and lessen its chances for federal assistance for state
projects under Title III.
E. Termination
"A commission shall terminate upon decision of the Council or
agreement of a majority of the states composing the commission."'
Whereas the creation of a commission requires the consent of both
"79
Stat. 253 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962d (Supp. 1966).
079 Stat. 248 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b-2(a) (Supp. 1966).
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parties,4 1 the termination of the federal-state partnership may be effected unilaterally by either party. If the experiment in creative federalism does not serve the purposes of the various parties, the experiment can be easily stopped. With such facile termination provisions,
the creative tension between partners must be controlled so that it does
not become so intense as to cause one party to terminate the creative
endeavor. Hopefully the consensus approach will provide the requisite control.
IV. TITLE IlI-FNANIAL AsSISTANCE To Tim STATES
Congress drafted Title III "in recognition of the need for increased
participation by the States in water and related land resources planning."14 2 Basically Title III gives the Water Resources Council the
power to decide which states and which projects will receive federal
assistance on a matching basis. States apply to the council for funds.
The Council "shall not disapprove any program without first giving
reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the State agency administering such program."4 The hearing requirement is the only effective limitation on the discretionary power of the Council. Hopefully the
hearing requirement will encourage the Council to act as a partner, and
cause it to persuade through the exercise of reason rather than intimidate by using economic or political sanctions.
A. Designationof a State Agency
The Act requires a state to designate an agency to carry out comprehensive water and related land resource development in order to
qualify for federal assistance. 44 A state, of course, may create an entirely new agency to carry out the task of water and related land resource planning. Such action may involve unnecessary time and expense, however, and may lead to duplicity in administrative function.
Rather than asking the legislature to create a new agency, a governor
may choose to designate an existing agency.
The State of Washington, for example, might decide to assign the
duties of water resource planning to the existing Water Pollution Control Commission or some similar agency. The statute creating the
Water Pollution Control Commission could be read as authorizing
Stat. 246 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962b (Supp. 1966).
' 79 Stat. 251 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962c(a) (Supp. 1966).
4179

-79 Stat. 252 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962c-2 (Supp. 1966).

"79 Stat 252 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1962c-2(3) (Supp. 1966).
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such action.4" In any event, an organizational scheme which places
water resource planning and water pollution control under one agency
would be advantageous. First, the agency could effectively divide its
functions and avoid duplicity in state planning responsibilities. Second, a wiser development of water resources would be possible because
the parties concerned with water development would be forced by
association, if nothing more, to examine the goals of water resource
planning-i.e. the conservation of water that is fit for required uses.
Third, such an organization would provide machinery that would enable a state to fulfill its proper function as a member of a river basin
commission. The centralization of water resource planning in one state
agency would make the state a stronger partner with the federal
government and other states in water and related land resource planning. The experiment in creative federalism, a federalism that depends
so much on the endeavors at the local level,46 would have a much
greater chance of succeeding.
B. Implicit Integration of Existing Programs
Implicit in the Act is the ability of existing study and planning
groups to be integrated into the structure of the Water Resources
Planning Act.4 7 For example, the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee consisting of seven governors and federal representatives, which
has water and related land resource responsibilities in the seven Columbia Basin States, might begin reporting to the Water Resources
Council rather than the Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources.
In effect the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee which has facilitated coordination of water resources policies and programs since
1946 could become a quasi-river basin commission (a commission not
formally created under the Act but subservient to the Council) if the
'" WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48.010 (1961), enunciating the general policy of the Water
Pollution Control Commission, says in part: "And to that end require the use of all
known and available and reasonable methods by industries and others to prevent and
control the pollution of waters of the State of Washington." Certainly proper water
resource planning would "prevent and control" pollution. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48.035
(1961), enumerates the general powers of the Commission, encouraging cooperation
with other states, and specifically authorizes interstate projects. Finally, WASH. REv.
CODE § 90.48.153 (1961), authorizes cooperation with the federal government.
" See Fortune, Jan. 1966, p. 228, where the author points out that success of federal
urban development projects depends heavily upon local investigative and administra-

tive efforts.
' See, e.g., Water Resources Planning Act, 79 Stat 244, 42 U.S.C. § 1962-1(d)
(Supp. 1966) where the "or entity performing the function of a river basin commission" language easily supports an implication that quasi-river basin commissions
were to be included under the Act.
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states do not follow through with their plans to create a Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission.48
If the states refuse to form river basin commissions, the experiment
in creative federalism may fail but the Water Resources Planning
Act may still be able to provide a valuable service of integration and
coordination among the federal agencies. There are at present some
twenty studies proceeding under the auspices of quasi-river basin
commissions; another fourteen studies are planned.4 9 If the Council
were to become the repository of these studies, the Water Resources
Planning Act could achieve some positive results without the aid of
the states. In fact, the tension generated between the various federal
agencies might be controlled so as to achieve a partial degree of
creativity. But experience in other undertakings, such as urban renewal, has demonstrated that superior results are obtained if state and
local arms participate actively and intelligentlyY°
V. AN EVALUATION
The Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 represents a controlled
and limited experiment in creative federalism. The Act is designed to
remove such impediments to joint venture as the federal and state dispute over water rights. By expressly stating that existing centers of
power will be preserved, the Act allows the federal and state partners
to assume what they will about the constancy or expandability of
power. In a final effort of accommodation the Act tries to avoid the
sensitive area of water diversion and grants special consideration to
states in the Upper Colorado and Columbia River Basins. Even
though the diversion issue remains obscure, the resulting ambiguity
may be helpful in postponing the study of diversion until the subject
can be approached with less passion. In any event the unanimous
support that the Act received in Congress testifies to the degree to
which its draftsmen succeeded in formulating an acceptable approach
" It is somewhat puzzling why the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee
(CBIAC) is being supplanted by a Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission. In
original drafts of the Water Resource Planning Act the special "three out of four
states concurring" provision for the Columbia River Basin was absent, suggesting
a continued reliance on CBIAC. But prior to the passage of the final act the special
provisions were added, indicating a change in attitude toward the CBIAC. Perhaps
the five states presently formulating the Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission
thought that they could protect their special interests better in a river basin commission that did not include Utah and Nevada. Under the existing CBIAC a diversion
of Columbia River water to Utah or Nevada could have been studied.
"An address by Henry P. Caulfield, Jr., 1965 Water for Texas Conference, Nov.

23, 1965.
' See Fortune, Jan. 1966, p. 228.
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to water resource planning. In fact the actual drafting process itself,
it would seem, was an example of creative federalism at work.
The Act provides for the creation of river basin commissions which
are to provide the life blood of the creative process. The tension required to generate creativity is maintained by conducting investigations and making recommendations employing a "consensus" process.
The process of consensus controls the degree of tension generated in
federal-state joint enterprises by allowing for divergence of opinion.
But even so, the partnerships will not be easy to maintain. The notion
of consensus may work to maximize the effectiveness of commissions,
but some issues may arise which are incapable of accommodation.
The delicacy with which these issues are handled will determine the
fate of the experiment.
The Water Resources Council is in a difficult pivotal position. It
must chart a proper course for water resource development by using
the recommendations of the basin commissions, the alternative proposals, and its own experience. In delicate situations it will become the
sole arbiter of conflicting viewpoints. Its federal composition may prevent it from fairly evaluating alternative courses or may at least create
the appearance of unfairness.
Title III of the Act, if properly administered by the Council, may
be the key to a successful experiment. The need for growth and innovation at the local level is great. Final plans adopted by Congress or
appropriate state bodies can only be as effective as the investigations
which spawned them. Federal financial assistance might very well improve the quantity and quality of local investigative efforts. And the
requirement that a state designate a state agency will certainly improve the quality of state endeavors by introducing an element of
coordination. However, anyone who would wager that the states will
be able to fulfill their role in the creative federalism experiment will
be ignoring recent historical trends,"' but the states are not prisoners of
history.
If the states capitulate, the experiment in creative federalism may
fail, but the Water Resources Planning Act can bring to the Federal
agencies some needed coordination in the area of water resource development. Middle management's reluctance to cooperate with coordination efforts may be overcome if the Council is able to function as a
I See Sanford, New Era Ahead for Your State, Nation's Bus., July 1965, pp. 56-57,
where an ex-governor advocates the strengthening of state government unaccompanied
by the weakening of federal government to solve state deficiencies.
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cabinet-level body.52 Existing conditions may be improved for quasiriver basin comissions if their reports are sent to the Water Resources Council instead of their respective agencies.53
At this time it is impossible to predict with any certainty the course
that the Water Resources Planning Act will followY The Act could
prove a very viable experiment in creative federalism-one which
eventually moves from planning to implementation. It might produce
only limited results in the area of water resource development because: (1) operation by consensus does not work satisfactorily, or
(2) the Council is too federally oriented, or (3) the states fail to meet
their responsibilities. Or, finally, it might fail totally. Much will depend upon the ingenuity and imagination of the men charged with the
responsibility of implementation. The Act has been set on its proper
course through the efforts of such men as Henry P. Caulfield, Jr. But
the work has just begun. Perhaps the men who experiment with this
and other acts can more readily succeed in their endeavors after
sufficient experience precipitates a clearer understanding of what an
experiment in creative federalism can involve.

r See Muskie, The Challenge of Creative Federalism, Saturday Rev., June 25,
1966, p. 12, for a discussion of middle management's reluctance to coordinate with
Federal agencies other than their own.
' By submitting their reports directly to the Water Resources Council, the quasiriver basin commissions would not have to compete with programs outside the area
of water resource development. The Water Resources Council could give the reports
a more thorough and perhaps more intelligent appraisal.
" As of May 1966 a Great Lakes Commission and a Northeast Commission had
partially been created. As of this writing the Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission awaits only the approval of President Johnson. But as can be seen, the life
of the Act has been too short to predict even the direction it will take.

